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Abstract 
Understanding how people rate their confidence is critical for characterizing a wide range of 
perceptual, memory, motor, and cognitive processes. However, as in many other fields, progress has 
been slowed by the difficulty of collecting new data and the unavailability of existing data. To address 
this issue, we created a large database of confidence studies spanning a broad set of paradigms, 
participant populations, and fields of study. The data from each study are structured in a common, 
easy-to-use format that can be easily imported and analyzed in multiple software packages. Each 
dataset is further accompanied by an explanation regarding the nature of the collected data. At the 
time of publication, the Confidence Database (available at osf.io/s46pr) contained 145 datasets with 
data from over 8,700 participants and almost 4 million trials. The database will remain open for new 
submissions indefinitely and is expected to continue to grow. We show the usefulness of this large 
collection of datasets in four different analyses that provide precise estimation for several 
foundational confidence-related effects and lead to new findings that depend on the availability of 
large quantity of data. This Confidence Database will continue to enable new discoveries and can 
serve as a blueprint for similar databases in related fields. 
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Introduction 
Researchers from a wide range of fields use ratings of confidence to provide fundamental insights 
about the mind. Confidence ratings are subjective ratings regarding one’s first-order task 
performance. For instance, participants may first make a decision regarding whether a probe stimulus 
belongs to a previously learned study list or not. A confidence rating, in this case, could involve the 
participants’ second-order judgment regarding how sure they are about the accuracy of the decision 
made in that trial (i.e., accuracy of the first-order task performance). Such second-order judgments 
reflect people’s ability to introspect and can be dissociated from the first-order judgment 
(Mamassian, 2016). Confidence ratings tend to correlate strongly with accuracy, response speed, and 
brain activity distinguishing old and new probes (Weidemann & Kahana, 2016) suggesting that they 
reflect relevant internal states.  
  
The question of how humans (or other animals) evaluate their own decisions has always been an 
important topic in psychology, and the use of confidence ratings dates back to the early days of 
experimental psychology (Peirce & Jastrow, 1884). In addition, confidence has been used as a tool to, 
among many other things, determine the number of distinct memory retrieval processes (Ratcliff, Van 
Zandt, & McKoon, 1995), reveal distortions of visual awareness (Azzopardi & Cowey, 1997), 
understand the factors that guide learning (Robey, Dougherty, & Buttaccio, 2017), assess the 
reliability of eyewitness testimony (Wixted & Wells, 2017), test theories of sensory processing (Green 
& Swets, 1966) and decision-making (Balakrishnan & Ratcliff, 1996; Mueller & Weidemann, 2008), 
help estimate the fit of parameters of the psychometric function more efficiently (Yi & Merfeld, 2016) 
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and characterize various psychiatric conditions (David, Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012). The wide 
application of confidence makes it a fundamental measure in psychological research.  
  
However, despite the widespread use of confidence ratings, scientific progress has been slowed by 
the traditional unavailability of previously collected data, requiring each researcher to collect their 
own. Consequently, testing a new idea often requires scientists to spend months or years gathering 
the relevant data. The substantial cost in time and money associated with new data collection has 
undoubtedly led to many new ideas simply being abandoned without ever being examined 
empirically. This is especially unfortunate given that these ideas could likely have been tested using 
the dozens of datasets already collected by other scientists.  
  
Typically, when data re-use takes place, it is within a lab or a small scientific group -- that often 
restricts itself to very specific paradigms -- which potentially limits the formation of a broader 
understanding of confidence across a wider range of tasks and participants. Therefore, another 
important advantage of data re-use lies in the diversity of experimental tasks, set-ups, and 
participants offered by compiling datasets from different labs and different populations. 
  
Although data sharing can speed up scientific progress considerably, fields devoted to understanding 
human behavior unfortunately have cultures of not sharing data (Hardwicke & Ioannidis, 2018; Vines 
et al., 2014). For example, Wicherts et al. (2006) documented their painstaking and ultimately 
unsuccessful endeavor to obtain behavioral data for re-analysis; despite persistent efforts, the 
authors were able to obtain just 25.7% of datasets the authors claimed to be available for re-analysis. 
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Nevertheless, recent efforts towards increased openness have started to shift the culture 
considerably and more and more authors post their data in online depositories (Munafò et al., 2017; 
Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2018). 
  
There are, however, several challenges involved in secondary analyses of data, even when such data 
have been made freely available. First, the file type may not be usable or clear for some researchers. 
For example, sharing files in proprietary formats may limit other researcher’s ability to access them 
(e.g., if reading the file requires software that is not freely or easily obtainable). Second, even if the 
data can be readily imported and used, important information about the data may not have been 
included. Third, researchers who need data from a large number of studies have to spend a 
considerable amount of time finding individual datasets, familiarizing themselves with how each 
dataset is organized, and organizing all datasets into a common format for analysis. Finally, given the 
size of the literature, it can be difficult to even determine which papers contain relevant data. 
  
Here we report on a large-scale effort to create a database of confidence studies that addresses all of 
the problems above. The database uses an open standardized format (.csv files) that can easily be 
imported into any software program used for analysis. The individual datasets are formatted using 
the same general set of guidelines making it less likely that critical components of the datasets are 
not included and ensuring that data re-use is much less time-consuming. Finally, creating a single 
collection of confidence datasets makes it much easier and faster to find datasets that could be re-
used for the purposes of testing new ideas or models. 
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Details on the database 
The Confidence Database is hosted on the Open Science Framework (OSF) website (osf.io/s46pr). 
Each dataset is represented by two files – a data file in .csv format and a readme file in .txt format. 
  
The majority of data files contain the following fields: participant index, stimulus, response, 
confidence, response time of the decision, and response time of confidence rating. Depending on the 
specific design of each study, these fields can be slightly different (e.g., if there are two stimuli on 
each trial or confidence and decision are given with a single button press). Further, many datasets 
include additional fields needed to fully describe the nature of the collected data. 
  
The readme files contain essential information about the contributor, corresponding published paper 
(if the dataset is published and current status of the project if not), stimuli used, confidence scale, and 
experimental manipulations. Other information such as the original purpose of the study, the main 
findings, the location of data collection, etc. are also often included. In general, the readme files 
provide a quick reference regarding the nature of each dataset including details that could be needed 
for future re-analyses. 
  
The Confidence Database includes a wide variety of studies. Individual datasets recruit different 
populations (e.g., healthy or patient populations), focus on different fields of study (e.g., perception, 
memory, motor control, decision making), employ different confidence scales (e.g., binary, n-point 
scales, continuous scales, wagering), use different types of tasks (e.g., binary judgements vs. 
continuous estimation tasks), and collect confidence at different times (e.g., after or simultaneous 
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with decision). Figure 1 gives a broad overview of the types of datasets included in the database at 
the time of publication. This variety ensures that future re-analyses can address a large number of 
scientific questions and test them based on multiple methods of evaluating one’s own primary task 
performance. 
 
Figure 1. Datasets currently in the Confidence Database. Pie charts showing the number of datasets 
split by category, publication year, number of participants, number of trials per participant, type of 
judgment, and rating scale. The label “Multiple” in the first pie chart indicates that the same 
participants completed tasks from more than one category. The maximum number of participants was 
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589 and the maximum trials per participant was 4,320 (“variable” indicates that different participants 
completed different number of trials). 
 
 
Importantly, the database will remain open for new submissions indefinitely. Instructions for new 
submissions are made available on the OSF page of the database. Carefully formatted .csv and .txt 
files that follow the submission instructions can be e-mailed to confidence.database@gmail.com. 
They will be checked for quality and then uploaded with the rest of the database. 
 
Finally, to facilitate searching the database, a spreadsheet with basic information regarding each 
study will be maintained (link can be found on the OSF page). The spreadsheet includes information 
about a number of different details regarding the dataset such as the field of study (e.g., perception, 
memory, etc.), authors, corresponding publication, number of participants and trials, the type of 
confidence scale, etc. 
  
At the time of publication, the Confidence Database contained 145 datasets, bringing together 8,787 
participants, for a total of 3,955,802 individual trials. The data were collected mostly in laboratory 
experiments (from 18 different countries over five continents) but also in online experiments. Despite 
its already large size, the database still contains only a small fraction of the available data on 
confidence and is expected to continue to grow. We encourage researchers who already make their 
data available to also submit their data to the Confidence Database. This would make their data 
easier to discover and re-use, and would multiply the impact of their research. 
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Anyone is encouraged to download and re-use the data from the database. The database is shared 
under the most permissive CC0 license thus placing the data in the public domain. As with the re-use 
of any other data, publications that result from such re-analysis should cite the current paper, as well 
as the listed citation for each of the datasets that were re-analyzed. We refer readers who wish to 
perform secondary data analyses to a useful discussion of this process, including the possibility of 
preregistering such analyses, by Weston et al. (2019). 
 
Example uses of the Confidence Database 
The Confidence Database can be used for a variety of purposes such as developing and testing new 
models of confidence generation; comparing confidence across different cognitive domains, rating 
scales, and populations; determining the nature of metacognitive deficits that accompany psychiatric 
disorders; characterizing the relationship between confidence, accuracy, and response times; and 
building theories of the response times associated with confidence ratings. Further, the database can 
also be used to test hypotheses unrelated to confidence due to the inclusion of choice, accuracy, and 
response time. Different studies can re-use a few relevant datasets (maybe even a single one) or 
simultaneously analyze a large set of the available datasets thus achieving substantially higher power 
than typical individual studies. 
 
Below we present results from four different example analyses in order to demonstrate the potential 
utility and versatility of the database. These analyses are designed to take advantage of a large 
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proportion of the available data, thus resulting in very large sample sizes. The codes for running these 
analyses are freely available at the OSF page of the database (https://osf.io/s46pr/).  
 
Analysis 1: How confidence is related to choice and confidence response times (RTs) 
One of the best known properties of confidence ratings is that they correlate negatively with choice 
RT (e.g., Weidemann & Kahana, 2016). However, despite its importance, this finding is virtually always 
treated as the outcome of a binary null-hypothesis significance test, which does not reveal the 
strength of the effect. At the same time, it is becoming widely recognized that building a replicable 
quantitative science requires that researchers, among other things, “adopt estimation thinking and 
avoid dichotomous thinking” (Cumming, 2014). Precise estimation, though, requires very large 
sample sizes and any individual study is usually not large enough to allow for accuracy in estimation. 
The Confidence Database thus provides a unique opportunity to estimate with unprecedented 
precision the strength of foundational effects such as the negative correlation between confidence 
and choice RT, thus informing theories that rely on these effects. Further, the database allows for 
investigations of lesser studied relationships such as between confidence and confidence RT. 
 
Using the data from the Confidence Database, we thus investigated the precise strength of the 
correlation of confidence with both choice and confidence RT. We first selected all datasets where 
choice and confidence RTs were reported. Note that some datasets featured designs where the 
choice and confidence were made with a single button press -- such datasets were excluded from the 
current analyses. In addition, we excluded individual participants who only used a single level of 
confidence because it is impossible to correlate confidence and RT for such subjects, and participants 
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for whom more than 90% of the data were excluded (which occurred for six participants from a study 
with very high confidence RTs; see below). In total, the final analyses were based on 4,089 
participants from 76 different datasets. 
 
Before conducting the main analyses, we performed basic data cleanup. This step is important as 
contributors are encouraged to include all participants and trials from an experiment even if some 
participants or trials were excluded from data analyses in the original publications. Specifically, we 
excluded all trials without a confidence rating (such trials typically came from studies that included a 
deadline for the confidence response), all trials without choice RT (typically due to a deadline on the 
main decision), and all trials with confidence and/or choice RTs slower than 5 seconds (the results 
remained very similar if a threshold of 3 or 10 seconds was used instead). These exclusion criteria 
resulted in removing 7.3% of the data. In addition, for each participant, we excluded all choice and 
confidence RTs differing by more than 3 standard deviations from the mean (resulting in the removal 
of additional 1.8% of the data). 
 
We then correlated, for each participant, the confidence ratings with choice RTs. We found that the 
average correlation across participants was r = -.24 (t(4088) = -71.09, p < 0.001). The very large 
sample size allowed us to estimate the average correlation with a very high degree of precision: the 
99.9% confidence interval for the average correlation value was [-.25, -.23], which should be 
considered as a medium-to-large effect (Funder & Ozer, 2019). At the same time, it is important to 
emphasize that the high precision in estimating the average correlation does not imply a lack of 
variability between individual participants. Indeed, we observed very high individual variability (SD = 
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.21), which we visualize by plotting all individual correlation values and corresponding density 
functions in the form of raincloud plots (Allen et al., 2019; Figure 2A). Still, the effect size is large 
enough (d = 1.11) that power analyses indicate that a sample size as small as N=9 provides >80% 
power and a sample size of N=13 provides >95% power to detect this effect (at α = .05). 
 
  
Figure 2. Correlating confidence with choice and confidence RT. (A) We found a medium-to-large 
negative correlation (r = -.24) between confidence and choice RT, as well as a small negative 
correlation (r = -.07) between confidence and confidence RT. (B) The strength of the two correlations 
in panel A were themselves correlated across subjects (r = .23). 
 
We next performed the same analyses for the correlation between confidence and confidence RT. We 
found that the average correlation across participants was r = -.07, SD = .24 (t(4088) = -18.77, p < 
0.001) with a 99.9% confidence interval for the average correlation value of [-.08, -.06]. This effect 
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should be considered as “very small for the explanation of single events but potentially consequential 
in the not-very-long run” (Funder & Ozer, 2019). The small but reliable negative association between 
confidence and confidence RT would have been particularly difficult to detect with a small sample 
size. Indeed, a study with a sample size of 33 (the median sample size of the studies in the Confidence 
Database) would have only 37% power of detecting this effect. To achieve power of 80%, one 
requires a sample size of N=93; for power of 95%, N=152 is needed.  
 
It should be noted that existing models of confidence generation (e.g., Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010) 
predict a lack of any association between confidence and confidence RT (but see Moran, Teodorescu, 
& Usher, 2015). The small but reliable negative correlation thus raises the question about what is 
causing this negative association. One possibility is that participants are faster to give high confidence 
ratings because a strong decision-related signal can propagate faster to neural circuits that generate 
the confidence response (e.g., Nikolov, Rahnev, & Lau, 2010) but further research is needed to 
directly test this hypothesis.  
 
Finally, we also found that the strength of the correlation between confidence and confidence RT was 
itself correlated with the strength of the correlation between confidence and choice RT, r(4087) = .20, 
p < 0.001 (Figure 2B). Future research should investigate whether this correlation is due to variability 
in individual participants or variability at the level of the datasets.  
 
Analysis 2: Serial dependence in confidence RT 
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It is well known that perceptual choices (Urai, Braun, & Donner, 2017), confidence judgments 
(Rahnev, Koizumi, McCurdy, D’Esposito, & Lau, 2015), and choice RTs (Laming, 1979) are subject to 
serial dependence. Such findings have been used to make fundamental claims about the nature of 
perceptual processing such as that the visual system forms a “continuity field” over space and time 
(Fischer & Whitney, 2014; Manassi, Liberman, Kosovicheva, Zhang, & Whitney, 2018). The presence 
of serial dependence can thus help reveal the underlying mechanisms of perception and cognition. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the presence of serial dependence has never been 
investigated for one of the most important components of confidence generation: confidence RT. 
Therefore, determining whether serial dependence exists for confidence, and if so, estimating 
precisely its effect size, can therefore provide important insight about the nature of confidence 
generation. 
 
To address this question, we considered the data from the Confidence Database. We analyzed all 
datasets in which confidence was provided with a separate button press from the primary decision 
and that reported confidence RT. In total, 82 datasets were included, comprising 4,474 participants. 
Data cleanup was performed as in the previous analysis. Specifically, we removed all trials without 
confidence RT and all trials with confidence RT slower than 5 seconds (results remained very similar if 
a threshold of 3 or 10 seconds was used instead), both on the current trial and up to seven trials back, 
because we wanted to investigate serial dependence up to lag-7 (this excluded a total of 4.3% of the 
data). Further, as before, we excluded, separately for each participant, all confidence RTs differing by 
more than 3 standard deviations from the mean (thus excluding additional 9.6% of the data).  
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We performed a mixed regression analysis predicting confidence RT with fixed effects for the recent 
trial history up to seven trials back (Urai et al., 2017) and random intercepts for each participant. 
Degrees of freedom were estimated using Satterthwaite’s approximation, as implemented in the 
lmerTest package (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2017). We found evidence for strong serial 
dependence in confidence RT. Specifically, there was a very large lag-1 autocorrelation (b = 1.346, 
t(1299601) = 153.6, p < 0.001; Figure 3). The strength of the autocorrelation dropped sharply for 
higher lags but remained significantly positive until at least lag-7 (lag-2: b = 0.088, t(1299643) = 99.5, 
p < 0.001; lag-3: b = 0.075, t(1299589) = 84.5, p < 0.001; lag-4: b = 0.063, t(1299553) = 71.8, p < 0.001; 
lag-5: b = 0.062, t(1299568) = 71.94, p < 0.001; lag-6: b = 0.056, t(1299614) = 64.9, p < 0.001; lag-7: b 
= 0.060, t(1299658) = 70.8, p < 0.001). 
 
 
Figure 3. Serial dependence in confidence RT. We observed a large lag-1 autocorrelation. The 
autocorrelation decreased for higher lags but remained significant up to lag-7. 
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These analyses provide the first evidence of serial dependence in confidence RT. What remains 
unclear is whether previous trials have a causal effect on the current trial. For example, it is possible 
that some of the observed serial dependence is due to a general speed up of confidence RTs over the 
course of each experiment. To address this question, future studies should experimentally manipulate 
the speed of the confidence ratings on some trials and explore whether such manipulations affect the 
confidence RT on subsequent trials.  
 
Analysis 3: Negative metacognitive sensitivity 
Many studies have shown that humans and other animals have the metacognitive ability to use 
confidence ratings to judge the accuracy of their own decisions (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). In 
other words, humans have positive metacognitive sensitivity (Fleming & Lau, 2014), meaning that 
higher levels of confidence predict better performance. However, it is not uncommon that individual 
participants fail to show the typically observed positive metacognitive sensitivity. Until now, such 
cases have been difficult to investigate because they occur infrequently within a given dataset.  
 
Using the Confidence Database, we estimated the prevalence of negative metacognitive sensitivity 
and investigated its causes. We analyzed all datasets that contained the variables confidence and 
accuracy. In total, 71 datasets were included, comprising of 4,768 participants. We excluded studies 
on subjective difficulty, because these investigate the relation between confidence and performance 
within correct trials. We further excluded participants who only reported a single level of confidence 
(since it is impossible to estimate metacognitive sensitivity for such participants), studies with a 
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continuous measure of accuracy, and participants for whom more than 90% of the data were 
excluded (which occurred for six participants from a study with very high confidence RTs). 
Metacognitive sensitivity was computed using a logistic regression predicting accuracy by normalized 
confidence ratings. This measure of metacognition has a number of undesirable properties (Fleming 
& Lau, 2014) but reliably indicates whether metacognitive sensitivity is positive or negative.  
 
We found that, across all participants, the average beta value from the logistic regression was .096, 
SD = .064, (t(4767) = 104.01, p < 2.2e-16; Figure 4A), thus indicating that metacognitive sensitivity 
was reliably positive in the group. However, 293 of the participants (6.1% of all participants) had a 
negative beta value, indicating the potential presence of negative metacognitive sensitivity.  
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Figure 4. The prevalence of estimates of negative metacognitive sensitivity. (A) Individual beta 
values and beta values density plot for the observed relationship between confidence and accuracy. 
(B-F) Scatter plots of the relationship between beta value for confidence-accuracy relationship and the 
number of trials (B), average accuracy (C), median choice RT (D), median confidence RT (E), and the 
proportion of trials where the most common confidence judgment was given (F).  
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We next explored why such negative coefficients may occur for these 293 participants. We reasoned 
that the majority of the cases of estimated negative metacognitive sensitivity could be due to several 
factors unrelated to the true metacognitive sensitivity of each participant. First, the negative beta 
values could simply be due to misestimation stemming from relatively small sample sizes. Even 
though the number of trials per participant did not correlate with participants’ beta coefficient 
(r(4766) = -.021, p = .143; Figure 4B), 9.9% of all participants with negative beta value completed less 
than 50 trials in total. Second, a positive relationship between confidence and accuracy can be 
expected only if performance is above chance (if performance is at chance, this may indicate that 
there is no reliable signal that could be used by the metacognitive system, although see Rosenthal, 
Andrews, Antoniades, Kennard, & Soto, 2016 and Scott, Dienes, Barrett, Bor, & Seth, 2014). We did 
indeed observe a correlation between the beta values and average accuracy (r(4766) = .203, p < 2.2e-
16, Figure 4C) with 19.4% of all participants with negative beta values having an accuracy of less than 
55%. Third, for those datasets including choice RT or confidence RT, we calculated the overall median 
choice/confidence RTs and correlated these with the beta coefficients (one dataset was excluded 
here, because the primary task was to complete Raven's progressive matrices and therefore choice 
and confidence RTs were within the range of minutes rather than seconds). Again, we observed 
significant correlations between betas and choice RTs (r(3076) = -.083, p < 3.617e-06, Figure 4D) and 
between betas and confidence RTs (r(2191) = .071, p = 0.001, Figure 4E), but the magnitude of these 
correlations was very small and respectively only 2.3% and 2.4% of participants with negative betas 
had median choice or confidence RT of less than 200 ms, respectively. Finally, we reasoned that beta 
coefficients could be misestimated if a very large proportion of confidence judgments were the same. 
Therefore, we computed the proportion of the most common confidence rating for each participant 
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(M=37.9%, SD = .22). We did not observe a significant correlation between the proportion of the most 
common confidence rating and the beta values (r(4766) = -.025, p = .086, Figure 4F), and only 5.4% of 
all participants with negative betas only used a single confidence rating for more than 95% of the 
time. 
 
Overall, 96 participants from the 293 with negative beta values (32.7%) completed less than 50 trials, 
had overall accuracy of less than 55%, or used the same confidence response on more than 95% of all 
trials. This means that 197 participants had negative beta values despite the absence of any of these 
factors (note that for 55 of these participants, no RT information was provided, so a few of them 
could have had overly fast choice or confidence RT). This result raises the question about the 
underlying causes of the negative beta values. Follow-up studies could focus on these subjects and 
determine whether there is anything different about them or the tasks that they completed. 
 
Analysis 4: Confidence scales used in perception and memory studies 
One of the strengths of the Confidence Database is that it allows for investigations on how specific 
effects depend on factors that differ from study to study. For example, for any of the analyses above, 
one could ask how the results depend on factors like the domain of study (i.e., perception, memory, 
cognitive, etc.), confidence scale used (e.g., n-point vs. continuous), whether confidence was 
provided simultaneously with the decision, the number of trials per participant, etc. These questions 
can reveal some of the mechanisms behind confidence generation, such as, for example, whether 
metacognition is a domain-specific or domain-general process (Faivre, Filevich, Solovey, Kühn, & 
Blanke, 2018; Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2018). 
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Here we took advantage of this feature of the Confidence Database to ask a meta-science question: 
Does the type of confidence scale researchers use depend on the subfield that they work in? 
Confidence ratings are typically given in one of two ways. The majority of studies use a discrete Likert 
scale (e.g., a 4-point scale where 1 = lowest confidence, 4 = highest confidence). Such scales typically 
have a fixed stimulus-response mapping so that a given button always indicates the same level of 
confidence (though variable stimulus-response mappings are still possible). Likert scales can also have 
different number of options. Fewer studies use continuous scales (e.g., a 0-100 scale where 0 = 
lowest confidence, 100 = highest confidence). Such scales typically do not have a fixed stimulus-
response mapping and responses are often given using a mouse click rather than a button press 
(though it is possible to use a keyboard in such cases too). 
 
We focused on the domains of perception and memory because these were the only two domains 
with a sufficient number of datasets in the database (89 datasets for perception and 27 datasets for 
memory; all other domains had at most 16 datasets; see Figure 1). We categorized each dataset from 
these two domains as employing a 2-point, 3-point, 4-point, 5-point, 6-point, 7-to-11-point, or a 
continuous confidence scale (we combined the 7- to 11-point scales into a single category because of 
the low number of datasets with such scales). Finally, we computed the percent of datasets with each 
of the confidence scales separately for the perception and memory domains. 
 
We found that there were several systematic differences between the two domains. Most notably, 
memory studies used a 3-point confidence scale 48% of the time (13 out of 27 datasets), whereas 
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perception studies used a 3-point confidence scale just 16% of the time (14 out of 89 datasets) with 
the difference in proportions being significant (Z = -3.49, p = 0.0005; Figure 5). On the other hand, a 
much lower percent of memory datasets (4%, 1 out of 27 datasets) used a continuous scale compared 
to perception studies (33%, 29 out of 89 datasets; Z = 3.002, p = 0.003). Both comparisons remained 
significant at the .05 level after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was applied. We did 
not find any difference between perception and memory studies for the rest of the confidence scale 
types (all p’s > 0.2 before Bonferroni correction). 
 
 
Figure 5. Confidence scale use for perception and memory studies. The percent of 2-point, 3-point, 4-
point, 5-point, 6-point, 7-to-11-point, and continuous confidence scales were plotted separately for 
perception and memory datasets. We combined the 7- to 11-point scales because of the low number 
of datasets with such scales. The two domains differed in how often they employed 3-point and 
continuous scales. 
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These results suggest the presence of systematic differences in how confidence is collected in 
perception and memory studies with most pronounced differences in the use of 3-point and 
continuous scales. Since it is unclear why perception and memory research would benefit from the 
use of different confidence scales, these findings may point to a lack of sufficient cross-talk between 
the two fields. Future research should first confirm the presence of such differences using an 
unbiased sample of published studies and then trace the origin of these differences. 
 
Data sharing in the behavioral sciences 
It is a sad reality that “most of the data generated by humanity’s previous scientific endeavors is now 
irrecoverably lost” (Hardwicke & Ioannidis, 2018). Data are lost due to outdated file formats; 
researchers changing universities, leaving academia, or becoming deceased; websites becoming 
defunct; and lack of interpretable metadata describing the raw data. It is unlikely that much of the 
data not already uploaded to websites dedicated to data preservation will remain available for future 
research several decades from now. 
  
We hope that the Confidence Database will contribute to substantially increased data preservation 
and serve as an example for similar databases in other subfields of behavioral science and beyond. 
Many subfields of psychology produce data that can be fully summarized in a single file using a 
common format and thus can be easily shared. The mere existence of such a database in a given field 
may encourage data sharing by facilitating the process of preparing and uploading data; indeed lack 
of easy options for data sharing is among the important factors preventing researchers from sharing 
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their data (Houtkoop et al., 2018; King, 2007). A popular database can also provide the benefit of the 
extra visibility afforded to the studies in it. Databases could serve as invaluable tools for meta-
analyses and as a means to minimize false positive rates that may originate from low-powered studies 
and publication bias (i.e., favoring significant findings) by simply including datasets that also show null 
effects. Importantly, it is critical that sharing data is done in an ethical fashion and that participant 
anonymity is not compromised (Alter & Gonzalez, 2018; Martone, Garcia-Castro, & VandenBos, 2018; 
Mello et al., 2013). 
  
Facilitation of data sharing would benefit from determining the factors that prevent researchers from 
exercising this important practice as part of their dissemination efforts. One of these factors could be 
the notion that researchers who spent resources to collect the original dataset should have priority 
over others in re-using their own data (Houtkoop et al., 2018; Tenopir et al., 2011). We argue that 
sharing data can have positive consequences for individual researchers by increasing the visibility of 
their research, the citation rate (Colavizza, Hrynaszkiewicz, Staden, Whitaker, & McGillivray, 2019), 
and its accuracy by enabling meta-analysis. Another set of factors are those that deter researchers 
from using shared data in open repositories. One of those factors is the belief that utilizing shared 
data could limit the impact of the work. Milham et al. (2018) addressed such issues by demonstrating 
that manuscripts using shared data can, in fact, result in impactful papers in cognitive neuroscience 
and make a case for a more universal effort for data sharing. We hope the construction and 
maintenance of the Confidence Database will help address some of these issues in the domain of 
confidence research. 
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Conclusion 
The traditional unavailability of data in the behavioral sciences is beginning to change with the 
requirement of data sharing by increasing numbers of funding agencies and individual researchers 
increasingly posting their data in the absence of official mandates to do so. The Confidence Database 
represents the first large-scale attempt to create a common database in a subfield of behavioral 
research. We believe that this effort will have a large and immediate effect on confidence research 
and will become the blueprint for many other field-specific databases.  
 
  
 31 
References 
Alter, G., & Gonzalez, R. (2018). Responsible practices for data sharing. American Psychologist, 73(2), 
146–156. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000258 
Azzopardi, P., & Cowey, A. (1997). Is blindsight like normal, near-threshold vision? Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 94(25), 14190–14194. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.94.25.14190 
Balakrishnan, J. D., & Ratcliff, R. (1996). Testing models of decision making using confidence ratings in 
classification. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 22(3), 
615–633. https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.22.3.615 
Colavizza, G., Hrynaszkiewicz, I., Staden, I., Whitaker, K., & McGillivray, B. (2019). The citation 
advantage of linking publications to research data. ArXiv. Retrieved from 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.02565 
Cumming, G. (2014). The new statistics: why and how. Psychological Science, 25(1), 7–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613504966 
David, A. S., Bedford, N., Wiffen, B., & Gilleen, J. (2012). Failures of metacognition and lack of insight 
in neuropsychiatric disorders. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
Biological Sciences, 367(1594), 1379–1390. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2012.0002 
Faivre, N., Filevich, E., Solovey, G., Kühn, S., & Blanke, O. (2018). Behavioral, Modeling, and 
Electrophysiological Evidence for Supramodality in Human Metacognition. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 38(2), 263–277. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0322-17.2017 
Fischer, J., & Whitney, D. (2014). Serial dependence in visual perception. Nature Neuroscience, 17(5), 
738–743. https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.3689 
Fleming, S. M., & Lau, H. (2014). How to measure metacognition. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8. 
 32 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00443 
Funder, D. C., & Ozer, D. J. (2019). Evaluating Effect Size in Psychological Research: Sense and 
Nonsense. Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 2(2), 156–168. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245919847202 
Green, D. M., & Swets, J. A. (1966). Signal detection theory and psychophysics. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Hardwicke, T. E., & Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2018). Populating the Data Ark: An attempt to retrieve, 
preserve, and liberate data from the most highly-cited psychology and psychiatry articles. PLOS 
ONE, 13(8), e0201856. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201856 
Houtkoop, B. L., Chambers, C., Macleod, M., Bishop, D. V. M., Nichols, T. E., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. 
(2018). Data Sharing in Psychology: A Survey on Barriers and Preconditions. Advances in Methods 
and Practices in Psychological Science, 1(1), 70–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245917751886 
King, G. (2007). An introduction to the dataverse network as an infrastructure for data sharing. 
Sociological Methods and Research, 36(2), 173–199. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124107306660 
Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2017). lmerTest Package: Tests in Linear 
Mixed Effects Models. Journal of Statistical Software, 82(13), 1–26. 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v082.i13 
Laming, D. (1979). Autocorrelation of choice-reaction times. Acta Psychologica, 43(5), 381–412. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-6918(79)90032-5 
Mamassian, P. (2016). Visual Confidence. Annual Review of Vision Science, 2(1), annurev-vision-
111815-114630. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-vision-111815-114630 
 33 
Manassi, M., Liberman, A., Kosovicheva, A., Zhang, K., & Whitney, D. (2018). Serial dependence in 
position occurs at the time of perception. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(6), 2245–2253. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-018-1454-5 
Martone, M. E., Garcia-Castro, A., & VandenBos, G. R. (2018). Data sharing in psychology. American 
Psychologist, 73(2), 111–125. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000242 
Mello, M. M., Francer, J. K., Wilenzick, M., Teden, P., Bierer, B. E., & Barnes, M. (2013). Preparing for 
Responsible Sharing of Clinical Trial Data. New England Journal of Medicine, 369(17), 1651–1658. 
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMhle1309073 
Metcalfe, J., & Shimamura, A. P. (1994). Metacognition: Knowing about Knowing. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Milham, M. P., Craddock, R. C., Son, J. J., Fleischmann, M., Clucas, J., Xu, H., … Klein, A. (2018). 
Assessment of the impact of shared brain imaging data on the scientific literature. Nature 
Communications, 9(1), 2818. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-04976-1 
Morales, J., Lau, H., & Fleming, S. M. (2018). Domain-General and Domain-Specific Patterns of Activity 
Supporting Metacognition in Human Prefrontal Cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 38(14), 
3534–3546. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2360-17.2018 
Moran, R., Teodorescu, A. R., & Usher, M. (2015). Post choice information integration as a causal 
determinant of confidence: Novel data and a computational account. Cognitive Psychology, 78, 
99–147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.01.002 
Mueller, S. T., & Weidemann, C. T. (2008). Decision noise: An explanation for observed violations of 
signal detection theory. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15(3), 465–494. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.15.3.465 
 34 
Munafò, M. R., Nosek, B. A., Bishop, D. V. M., Button, K. S., Chambers, C. D., Percie du Sert, N., … 
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2017). A manifesto for reproducible science. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(1), 
0021. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-016-0021 
Nelson, L. D., Simmons, J., & Simonsohn, U. (2018). Psychology’s Renaissance. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 69. 
Nikolov, S., Rahnev, D., & Lau, H. (2010). Probabilistic model of onset detection explains paradoxes in 
human time perception. Frontiers in Psychology, 1(September), 37. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00037 
Peirce, C. S., & Jastrow, J. (1884). On Small Differences in Sensation. Memoirs of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 3, 75–83. 
Pleskac, T. J., & Busemeyer, J. R. (2010). Two-stage dynamic signal detection: a theory of choice, 
decision time, and confidence. Psychological Review, 117(3), 864–901. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019737 
Rahnev, D., Koizumi, A., McCurdy, L. Y., D’Esposito, M., & Lau, H. (2015). Confidence Leak in 
Perceptual Decision Making. Psychological Science, 26(11), 1664–1680. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797615595037 
Ratcliff, R., Van Zandt, T., & McKoon, G. (1995). Process dissociation, single-process theories, and 
recognition memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 124(4), 352–374. Retrieved 
from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8530910 
Robey, A. M., Dougherty, M. R., & Buttaccio, D. R. (2017). Making Retrospective Confidence 
Judgments Improves Learners’ Ability to Decide What Not to Study. Psychological Science, 
28(11), 1683–1693. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797617718800 
 35 
Rosenthal, C. R. R., Andrews, S. K. K., Antoniades, C. A. A., Kennard, C., & Soto, D. (2016). Learning and 
recognition of a non-conscious sequence of events in human primary visual cortex. Current 
Biology, 26(6), 834–841. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2016.01.040 
Scott, R. B., Dienes, Z., Barrett, A. B., Bor, D., & Seth, A. K. (2014). Blind Insight : Metacognitive 
Discrimination Despite Chance Task Performance. Psychological Science, 25(12), 2199–2208. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614553944 
Tenopir, C., Allard, S., Douglass, K., Aydinoglu, A. U., Wu, L., Read, E., … Frame, M. (2011). Data 
Sharing by Scientists: Practices and Perceptions. PLoS ONE, 6(6), e21101. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0021101 
Urai, A. E., Braun, A., & Donner, T. H. (2017). Pupil-linked arousal is driven by decision uncertainty and 
alters serial choice bias. Nature Communications, 8(1), 14637. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms14637 
Vines, T. H., Albert, A. Y. K., Andrew, R. L., Débarre, F., Bock, D. G., Franklin, M. T., … Rennison, D. J. 
(2014). The Availability of Research Data Declines Rapidly with Article Age. Current Biology, 
24(1), 94–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.CUB.2013.11.014 
Weidemann, C. T., & Kahana, M. J. (2016). Assessing recognition memory using confidence ratings 
and response times. Royal Society Open Science, 3(4), 150670. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.150670 
Weston, S. J., Ritchie, S. J., Rohrer, J. M., & Przybylski, A. K. (2019). Recommendations for Increasing 
the Transparency of Analysis of Preexisting Data Sets. Advances in Methods and Practices in 
Psychological Science, 251524591984868. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245919848684 
Wicherts, J. M., Borsboom, D., Kats, J., & Molenaar, D. (2006). The poor availability of psychological 
 36 
research data for reanalysis. American Psychologist, 61(7), 726–728. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.726 
Wixted, J. T., & Wells, G. L. (2017). The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and 
Identification Accuracy: A New Synthesis. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 18(1), 10–
65. https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100616686966 
Yi, Y., & Merfeld, D. M. (2016). A Quantitative Confidence Signal Detection Model: 1. Fitting 
Psychometric Functions. Journal of Neurophysiology, jn.00318.2015. 
https://doi.org/10.1152/jn.00318.2015 
 
